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MEDIATOR LEVERAGE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
Kyle Beardsley*
INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous variation in how third parties conduct
international mediation.1 Mediation might involve such functions as
the mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in the negotiation
process, shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement in which
the third party shapes the incentives of the parties to reach an
agreement.2 With such possible variation, mediators must especially
tailor the level of leverage—the extent to which the third party uses
* Kyle Beardsley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Emory College
of Arts & Sciences, Emory University.
1 Mediation entails permissive third-party engagement with multiple
disputants in a peace process.
2 The mediation literature has focused on three main styles of mediation
that need not be mutually exclusive: facilitation, formulation and manipulation. See
generally Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan
Wilkenfeld, Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 58 (2006);
Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, a Review of
Practice, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS &
TECHNIQUES 125-53 (I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997); I.
William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation, in LEASHING THE DOGS
OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 437-54 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 2007); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen J. Young, David M.
Quinn & Victor Asal, MEDIATING INTERNATIONAL CRISES (2005); David Quinn,
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Pelin Eralp, Victor Asal & Theodore McLauchlin, Crisis
Managers but Not Conflict Resolvers: Mediating Ethnic Intrastate Conflicts in Africa,
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. (forthcoming 2013).

57

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:1

positive and negative inducements, either explicit or implicit, to move
negotiations forward—to the needs of the situation.3 In international
dispute mediation, a one-size-fits-all view of mediation may actually
inhibit effective conflict resolution.
This essay highlights the importance of third parties choosing
their mediation styles with eyes wide open to the context of the
conflict. In what follows, this essay first considers existing studies
that have found both potential benefits and risks of heavy-handed
third-party involvement—which rely on implicit or explicit threats of
punishment or promises of assistance—as a conflict-management
strategy.4 It then considers a few illustrative cases to demonstrate the
importance of making sure that the tools of mediation fit the context.
Finally, it concludes with a discussion of how sustained post-conflict
peacekeeping and peacebuilding can reduce some of the risks of
leverage in mediation.
I. THE STRENGTHS AND RISKS OF LEVERAGE IN EXISTING STUDIES
Starting with the upside of leverage, existing work has found
that it is often critical that international dispute mediators employ
positive and negative inducements in a way that creates sufficient

3 The use of leverage matches to the “manipulative” style used in the
literature referenced above. See, e.g., Peter J. D. Carnevale, Strategic Choice in
Mediation, 2 NEGOT. J. 41, 44-45 (1986) (characterizing the use of leverage in
mediation as involving “compensation” and “pressing” tactics). In addition to
“manipulation,” the use of leverage is also sometimes referred to as a “directive”
style of mediation. See, e.g., KENNETH KRESSEL, LABOR MEDIATION: AN
EXPLORATORY SURVEY 13 (1972); Peter J. D. Carnevale & Richard Pegnetter, The
Selection of Mediation Tactics in Public-Sector Disputes, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 67 (1985).
Moreover, the use of leverage can also be termed “power” mediation. See, e.g.,
Loraleigh Keashly & Ronald J. Fisher, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions:
Theoretical and Practical Considerations, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 235 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996);
Isak Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Exploring Power Mediators and Pure
Mediators in Civil Wars, 12 INT’L NEGOT. 229, 230 (2007). But see Robert Rauchhaus,
Asymmetric Information, Mediation and Conflict Management, 58 WORLD POL. 207, 22425, 233 (2006) (terming it “heavy” mediation).
4 Mediation with leverage can involve both immediate inducements for
agreement or pledges of future inducements to help guarantee the peace.
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leverage to incentivize the disputing parties to reach an agreement.5
Intractable conflicts often need external prodding to create a sense of
a mutually hurting stalemate when the status quo level of hostilities
seems more acceptable to the parties than taking political or security
risks in making substantial concessions.6 The set of tools available to
intermediaries that do not use leverage is indeed quite limited. Third
parties that merely serve a role of providing the disputants with
greater clarity of the relevant parameters often struggle to learn
information that the disputants themselves do not already know or to
convey credibly such information, or both.7 Moreover, third parties
that are unable to use leverage to guarantee settlements reached
during negotiations will be unable to resolve concerns of mistrust
between vulnerable actors who might be reluctant to reach a deal that
obliges them to draw down their security forces.8 Leverage might also
be needed to shield the disputants from political backlash for
unpopular concessions.9

This relates to work pioneered by Jacob Bercovitch on contingency
theory. See generally, e.g., Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method
in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of
Mediation, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 329 (2006); Jacob Bercovitch & Richard
Jackson, Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of
Conflict Management in International Conflict, 17 NEGOT. J. 59 (2001); Jacob Bercovitch
& Jeffrey Langley, The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International
Mediation, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 670 (1993).
6 I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation: Conflict
Resolution and Power Politics, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 27, 41 (1985); Zartman & Touval,
International Mediation, supra note 2; Saadia Touval, Why the U.N. Fails, 73 FOREIGN
AFF. 44, 51 (1994); Moorad Mooradian & Daniel Druckman, Hurting Stalemate or
Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95, 36 J. PEACE RES. 709, 712
(1999); Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds?, supra note 3 at 237. See also Molly
M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013) (offering an
account of how actors with leverage are deemed more acceptable by disputants).
7 See Mark Fey & Kristopher W. Ramsay, When is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth
the Commute? Information Sharing Through Mediation, 62 WORLD POL. 529, 531 (2010);
Alastair Smith & Allan Stam, Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of
Civil and Interstate War, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 115, 117 (2003).
8 See generally BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE
SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS (2002).
9 See Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo, Third-Party Conflict Management and the
Willingness to Make Concessions, J. CONFLICT RESOL. (forthcoming 2013).
5
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On the other hand, even though many negotiations critically
depend on third-party pressure, there are also real risks for using too
much third-party leverage when less would suffice. Not only is
leverage more costly to the third party, which often must follow
through on threats and promises, but it can prove detrimental to
peace stability in the long term. When third parties are heavy handed
in their approach, they create artificial incentives for agreements that
are not likely sustainable over time.10 As a third-party’s interests shift
and influence wanes, former combatants that had reached an
agreement primarily because of the third-party’s enticements will be
more prone to abandon their agreements than former combatants
that reached an agreement with less incentivizing. The problem of
attenuated third-party involvement is especially strong when multiple
third parties are involved heavy-handedly in the peace process
because of the more difficult coordination needs in the post-conflict
setting.11 Separately, mediation with leverage can also restrict the
ability for disputants to walk away from negotiations that their
opponent is pursuing as a simple stalling tactic or that are otherwise
destined to fail.12
The existing work on mediation regarding these tradeoffs
suggests a basic rule of thumb that mediation with leverage should be
reserved only to stop ongoing or imminent massive bloodshed,
especially when the violence endangers non-combatants. That is, the
10 See KYLE BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA (2011); Kyle
Beardsley, Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency
Problems, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 723, 737 (2008); Suzanne Werner & Amy Yuen,
Making and Keeping Peace, 59 INT’L ORG. 261, 269 (2005); Mehmet Gurses, Patrick
McLeod & Nicolas Rost, Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace, 34
INT’L INTERACTIONS 129, 136 (2008); Zartman & Touval, International Mediation,
supra note 2 at 452 (highlights the dilemma that mediators face in choosing to push
for an early ceasefire or wait for a durable settlement to emerge).
11 See BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA, supra note 10; Tobias
Böhmelt, Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation, 41 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 859, 860 (2011); Chester A. Crocker, Pamela Aall & Fen Osler Hampson, Is
More Better?: The Pros and Cons of Multiparty Mediation, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE
CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 497-513 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 2001); Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic
Peacemaking, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).
12 See generally Kyle Beardsley, Intervention without Leverage: Explaining the
Prevalence of Weak Mediators, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 272 (2009).
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use of strong mediation should be motivated primarily out of shortterm humanitarian goals in order to justify the long-term risks of
making post-conflict peace more fragile and the lack of patience in
waiting for a more organic peace to emerge. At the same time, more
minimal third-party involvement should be used when a long-term,
self-enforcing peace is the most pressing concern and humanitarian
responsibilities are not as pressing. Indeed, it is difficult, and in many
cases impossible, for third parties to successfully attain both an
immediate reduction in hostilities and a long-term resolution of the
relevant points of contention.
II. MATCHING THE TOOL TO THE PROBLEM IN PRACTICE
It is helpful to consider historical cases in which hindsight
suggests that third parties used too little or too much leverage, as well
as cases in which the level of leverage more appropriately matched
the needs of the situation. The problem of not using sufficient
leverage when it is needed to stop mass atrocities can be seen recently
in Syria.13 Kofi Annan’s initiative to facilitate a ceasefire between
Assad and the rebels never had teeth as long as Russia and China
blocked passage of U.N. Security Council resolutions that would
authorize punishment for continued intransigence and as long as a
coalition of the willing to threaten Assad failed to materialize. During
the ceasefire, Assad was more or less free to continue direct attacks
against rebel positions and indirect attacks against sympathizers via
support for pro-government militias.
On the flip side, the risk of using too much short-term
leverage was demonstrated perhaps most dramatically in the lead up
to the 1994 Rwanda genocide.14 The 1993 Arusha Accords resulted
from substantial third-party pressure and the promise of a
peacekeeping force to guarantee the peace. However, once the
mediator involvement waned upon the signing of the Accords and
13 J. Michael Greig, in this issue, provides a detailed account of why this
conflict has proven so difficult to manage. J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights
from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 48
(2013).
14 See Alan J. Kuperman, The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes
Do More Damage than Good, 16 SAIS REV. 221, 222 (1996).
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the peacekeeping force turned out to be weaker than expected and
slow to deploy, implementation of the Accords failed and a window
of opportunity for Hutu extremist militias to establish their
dominance emerged. Stated more particularly, the leverage of the
mediating parties, coupled with their inability to follow through on
their commitments, left much of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu
populations vulnerable to annihilation perpetrated by Hutu militia
groups intentionally left out of the peace process. It is also important
to note that the violence during the Rwandan civil war that preceded
the Accords was not nearly as threatening to non-combatant
populations as the genocide that followed. That is, the heavy-handed
third-party involvement, in retrospect, was not well justified on
humanitarian grounds.
More positively, Richard Holbrooke’s role in pushing for the
Dayton Accords amidst NATO bombings of Serbian positions at the
end of the Bosnian War presents a compelling example of a case in
which the use of much needed leverage effectively calmed a
humanitarian disaster. Prior to the extreme heavy-handed
intervention, earlier mediation attempts lacking sufficient leverage
failed to halt the violence. These earlier efforts stand in stark contrast
to Holbrooke’s role, such that it is often lamented that the
international community did not act stronger sooner. Note that this
does not mean that Holbrooke’s role is an appropriate model of how
third parties can foster long-term, self-enforcing peace, as Bosnia
continues to sit on a razor’s edge with a real risk of returning to
interethnic conflict. But it does well demonstrate that strong thirdparty involvement is often necessary to stop the killing and force a
hurting stalemate, and that the risks of long-term instability may very
well be worth the intervention.
Another example of a well-matched mediation effort, Marti
Ahtisaari’s role in the Aceh peace process, which led to the
transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) from a rebel
group to a legitimate political actor, demonstrates the promise of
more hands-off involvement being better able to facilitate long-term
peace. As the former president of Finland and founder of the Crisis
Management Initiative, Ahtisaari lacked any ability to manipulate the
incentives of the disputants, but he was able to shape the momentum
for peace—generated by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and
62
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military gains by Indonesian forces—and help formulate an
agreement that involved concessions on both sides with an eye
toward long-term political transformation. This example, however,
illustrates that while agreements that result from softer forms of
mediation are more likely to become self-sustaining, the problem is in
getting to the agreement in the first place. Without leverage, the
parties already have to be motivated to resolve their dispute
peacefully, but that is often asking quite a lot. Weak mediation may
not carry much risk, but it also might not carry much value added
when a protracted conflict environment needs more third-party
engagement. That is, weak mediation can perform quite well when
the conflict is already “ripe” for resolution, but it can struggle to help
“ripen” the conflict in the first place.15
III. COMBINING MEDIATION WITH PEACEKEEPING AND
PEACEBUILDING
In light of the limitations and risks surrounding the use of
leverage, single third-party efforts generally fail to produce both
immediate humanitarian relief to the bloodiest conflicts and longterm conflict resolution. As such, it is helpful to think more broadly
about peace processes as potentially involving multiple third-party
efforts that unfold over time. Post-conflict peacekeeping and
peacebuilding, when effective, can supplement mediator efforts to
achieve both short-term and long-term effects.16 If there is sufficient
international will to sustain leverage and engagement after hostilities
have attenuated, then mediation is not likely to create a large risk for
a fragile peace after short-term success in attenuating the hostilities.

See I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 266 (1985); J. Michael Greig, Moments of Opportunity:
Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals, 45 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 692 (2001) (overviews what ripeness entails).
16 Peacekeeping and peacebuilding both entail permissive third-party
involvement for the purposes of enhancing the stability and duration of peace in a
post-conflict environment. Peacekeeping implies a military component, and
peacebuilding implies a political, social or economic component. These terms often
overlap but need not be provided by the same third parties performing mediation.
15
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Turning first to peacekeeping, deploying international forces
can maintain the outside pressure that existed at the time of
agreement and keep the parties motivated to uphold their
commitments. That being said, peacekeeping is expensive—even
when the costs can be distributed across U.N. or regional
organization memberships—and the financial and decision-making
burdens often fall to those third parties in the developed world that
are fairly insulated from the externalities of recurrent conflict. So,
peacekeeping cannot be counted on as a solution to the mediation
attenuation problem because third parties that would be willing to
step in as peacekeepers and indefinitely remain engaged as guarantors
of the peace are often hard to find.17
Peacebuilding missions that follow intrastate conflict provide
an interesting middle ground, and their increasing prominence is
perhaps well justified given how they can help resolve the long-term
issues caused by heavy-handed, third-party involvement.
Peacebuilding encompasses a number of reforms that can include
various dimensions of political, economic and security sector
reform.18 Relevant to the long-term risks related to heavy-handed
mediation, one of the central goals of peacebuilding is to ensure that
the key stakeholders are invested in maintaining peace and not
dependent on third-party inducements. Through the promotion of
democracy and power sharing, peacebuilding strives to enable the
voices of each of the key constituent groups to be heard; through the
promotion of economic development, peacebuilding strives to
diversify the set of groups that would benefit from sustained peace;
and through security sector reform, peacebuilding strives to improve
the capacity of the state to maintain order and reduce the ability for
one side to threaten others through use of the state security
apparatus. While peacebuilding that follows strong mediation can
See generally VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?:
SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICE AFTER CIVIL WAR (2008); MICHAEL W. DOYLE
& NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS
PEACE OPERATIONS (2006). This is not to say that peacekeeping is ineffective
when it occurs, which would be inconsistent with some of the existing literature.
The point is that peacekeeping cannot be taken as a given supplement to mediator
leverage, as it still depends crucially on third-party long-term investment.
18 See ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL
CONFLICT 38-39 (2004).
17
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help bridge the gap between the incentives at the time of agreement
and the incentives in the future in the absence of sustained thirdparty engagement, an important caveat is that peacebuilding in many
post-conflict states might be more accurately described as nation
building and still needs substantial, sustained international
involvement for self-sustaining peace to adhere. Moreover, a close
equivalent of peacebuilding does not in practice exist for interstate
conflicts.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered the risks inherent in deciding how
much leverage a third party should bring to bear in a conflict
management effort. Too much leverage, especially when the leverage
is difficult to sustain indefinitely, can risk promoting artificial
incentives that lead to fragile terms of peace. Too little leverage in the
face of ongoing and imminent bloodshed carries obvious
humanitarian risks. The lesson to take away from this analysis is not
that mediators can do no good. Indeed, mediators can do much good
when they are able to use leverage to stop ongoing brutal violence in
the short-term, especially when they can sustain that leverage over
time. Moreover, mediators can do much good when they use lighter
tactics to help disputants get over some of the final barriers to
durable settlements that are not negotiated under duress. In these
ways, practitioners of mediation can choose the form of their
involvement with accurate expectations of both the potential merits
of involvement and the potential risks.
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